Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System As Reflected in the November 2004 General Election
June 2006
Page(s) : 3-32
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Elections: The Nation's Evolving Election System As Reflected in the November 2004 General Election--Executive Summary

Report to Congressional Committees

Highlights

     Why GAO Did This Study

     The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation's elections processes, not all of which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics.

     What GAO Recommends

     GAO is not making any recommendations at this time.

     What GAO Found

     In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting system standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process.

     GAO found that states made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued--such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines.

Purpose

     Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be able to cast their votes and have their validly cast votes counted accurately. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting systems raised concerns about the fairness and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,¹ and major election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public confidence that our election system works.

     The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that tested changes states have made to their systems of election administration since the 2000 general election and the first presidential election since the enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a number of provisions related to the administration of federal elections affecting voter registration, absentee voting, voting systems, and other election administration activities.

     The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as the 2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and members of Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the elections process. Following the November 2004 election, a number of members of Congress asked us to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, we initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress using an approach similar to that we used to examine election issues following the November 2000 election. During the design of the review, GAO kept key committees of jurisdiction and interested parties informed of its work.

     This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 election for each major stage of the election process--voter registration, absentee and early voting, Election Day preparation and activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--and for voting technology.

Background

     In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, and local entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted in several major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the opportunities for citizens to register to vote in federal elections by allowing registration by mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and other public agencies, and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting by these populations.

     The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections residing at the local jurisdiction level--generally, the county level in most states, but some states have delegated election responsibility to subcounty governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 states account for about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election jurisdictions in the United States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 U.S. Census population. Local election jurisdictions vary widely in size and complexity, ranging from small New England townships to Los Angeles County, whose number of registered voters exceeds that of many states. Our election system is based upon a complex interaction of people (voters, election officials, and poll workers), processes (controls), and technology that must work effectively together to achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election process--registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting--is affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology.

     Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that election.² These reports also identified challenges that election officials reported they faced in major stages of the election process. We have also issued reports since the November 2004 general election on voter registration issues and security and reliability of electronic voting. As appropriate, information from our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide was used as a basis for determining changes since 2000.³ Our more recent reports were used to supplement this report on challenges election officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology for this report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in such factors as geographic location, whether early voting was offered, whether recounts for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting technology used.⁴ Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were among those we had visited for our 2001 election report. In stratifying our nationwide mail survey of local election jurisdictions, we grouped election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. Census population--small (less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), and large (more than 100,000). These categories are also used in this report to describe jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local surveys are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on our Web site at www.gao.gov.⁵

Results in Brief

     The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since the 2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners who, under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives; however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states' procurement of new voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines.

     In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state administration of federal elections. Some key changes included requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration lists, a requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide identification with their registration application or when they vote for the first time at the polls, and a requirement that most states permit, under certain circumstances, the casting of provisional ballots--those cast by voters at the polls whose eligibility to vote is unclear and to be determined later--in elections for federal office. HAVA also provided for funding to encourage states to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out voting system standards that state voting systems used in federal elections must meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, the act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that HAVA's requirements may have on the elections process because those requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to implement HAVA's requirements for provisional voting and identification for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems from January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in different stages of replacing their older voting equipment, such as punch card and lever machines, with newer technology.

     On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their progress in implementing their statewide voter registration lists and how they have implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA's requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration lists, all other states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and procedures at the state and local level for performing required list maintenance functions. Thus, states are still working to fully implement HAVA's voter registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their statewide voter registration and data-matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be expected.

     We also found that implementation of the identification provision for certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we visited said that applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations and thus would be subject to the HAVA identification requirements. Other local jurisdictions we visited said applications from registration drives were not to be treated as mail registrations and therefore were not subject to the HAVA identification requirements. As to the other two provisions, the results of GAO's survey of state and local officials and jurisdictions we visited showed that states varied in their implementation of HAVA's requirement for provisional voting. One variation of particular note during the November 2004 election was the difference in state requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in some jurisdictions, once the voter's eligibility to vote had been verified, the provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the voter's county of residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot was counted only if the voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. Notwithstanding these variations for implementing provisional voting, it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote.

     Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that large jurisdictions are replacing older voting equipment with more technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and constitute the majority of jurisdictions across the United States. On the basis of states' reported plans and local jurisdictions' estimated plans for acquiring voting systems for future elections, the election technology environment can be characterized as varied and evolving. Accordingly, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall election process.

     In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states reported having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to reform election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had eliminated the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states reported establishing procedures to conduct an automatic recount (audit), in full or in part, of the vote tabulation to help ensure accuracy of the vote prior to certification.

     Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 general election. Some of these challenges were also identified as challenges in GAO's October 2001 comprehensive report on the election processes, while others were raised with us for the first time.

     Continuing Challenges in 2004

     • Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to voter registration applications with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations by the same person, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. Election jurisdictions also continued to face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities.

     • Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, election officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 jurisdiction we visited, election officials reported they referred to the district attorney for investigation matters pertaining to 44 individuals who allegedly voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures.

     • Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small jurisdictions.

     • Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for vote counting that had confronted election officials across the country in the November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for them in the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately.

     • Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and visits, voting system performance measures have not been systematically embraced, reliable performance data have not been collected, and security and testing activities have not been consistently required and performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective management of voting technology remains a challenge for many states and local jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations.

     New Challenges in 2004

     • Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of various groups to "get out the vote" by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for registration. The conditions that election officials reported experiencing in processing the volume of voter registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train temporary workers, can result in data entry errors that would have the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not reported as a prevalent problem, applications received from voter registration drives was a challenge reported by election officials, who said that some of these applications had incomplete or invalid addresses, fictitious names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names.

     • Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting from larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of large early voter turnout.

     • New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the next two subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable.

     • Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on Election Day. In some instances, these third parties simply increased the number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in others, election officials told us third-party observers' behavior negatively affected poll workers and voters.

     • Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance where states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, states reported various differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another way states varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in the design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them.

     • Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for tallying the final vote count.

     • Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge in ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their voting systems in light of their adoption of various versions of federal voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat different--and, in some cases, outdated--performance thresholds for voting equipment. Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines by EAC on December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that states and local jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and certifying their voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting system certification--including federal, state, and local governments; testing authorities; and vendors--may need the capacity to assume the workloads associated with the adoption of current standards, including upgrading, testing, and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet the standards, particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 general election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a more integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic efforts in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems and managing risks in this dynamic election environment.

Principal Findings

     Voter Registration

     In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals--minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to vote, and ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the registration lists. During 2004 and 2005, many states were in the process of implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and associated requirements for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential benefits to be gained from HAVA's requirement for a statewide voter registration list were not evident in many states at the time of the November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA intended to help states and local election jurisdictions have access to more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists with a state agency's records to identify felons who may be ineligible to vote.

     Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to be registered to vote and their names were not on the voter registration list. When this occurs, under HAVA's provisional voting requirements, states must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if the voters assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction where they desire to vote and are eligible to vote in a federal election. The results of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered problems determining whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be counted where voters claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency or at another NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at one of those offices.

     While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration applications they receive. Local election jurisdictions continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists for the November 2004 election such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, and ineligible voters appearing on the lists. The surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of registration with assurances that only eligible voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election officials reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were submitted just before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. According to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, entering voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for some election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the jurisdiction, and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added to the voter registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in figure 1* we estimate that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide received applications just prior to the registration deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day, with large jurisdictions experiencing problems more than medium and small jurisdictions.⁶

     During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election officials reported that they hired 80 full-time temporary workers who worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 10,000 last-minute registration applications.

     According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter registration applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA entities' staff and local election office's staff for data entry and tracking of registration application forms. However, some local jurisdictions did not report having such management processes. We estimate that 76 percent of all jurisdictions provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of registration applications, and we estimate that over half of all jurisdictions tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some local jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes such as tracking the number of applications distributed and the source from which applications are received, and providing receipts to voter registrants to help alleviate problems encountered with properly registering voters.

     In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of registration applications received through voter registration drives, on the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that appeared to have fraudulent names. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported receiving voter registration applications that had irregularities. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported receiving applications that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were incomplete, or had invalid addresses. Election officials in another jurisdiction also reported receiving applications with fictitious names and fake signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in relation to the total number of applications received.

     Absentee and Early Voting

     Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional states reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their provisions for permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or individuals with disabilities), allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in absentee voters provide an affidavit from a notary or witness for their signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Furthermore, HAVA amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States from the year during which the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next regularly scheduled general elections for federal office.

     Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier for voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On the basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, more than half of all jurisdictions encountered problems receiving absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from voters too late to process--an estimated 55 percent of jurisdictions received applications too late and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late, as shown in figure 2.*

     Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of applications and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the estimated number of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem to be of some concern to state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee. But such deadlines can create difficulties for election officials, providing a short period of time to ensure that eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote, including having time to notify voters and have the voters correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to sign them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters' ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in time for their votes to be counted is another example of the difficulties of balancing voter access and ease of voting with appropriate election administration processes and controls.

     Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on absentee ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost half of the jurisdictions encountered problems with missing or illegible signatures on absentee ballot applications, and our survey results also indicate that local jurisdictions encountered problems with, among other things, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses on absentee applications and missing or incomplete witness information for a voter's signature or information. In jurisdictions that we visited, some election officials told us of steps they took, when time permitted, to address voter errors. States reported having information on their Web sites that included information on the basic requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us by elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting absentee.

     Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of jurisdictions used procedures in the November 2004 election designed to help ensure that absentee voters did not vote more than once and that absentee ballots were actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. However, some mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. In particular, election officials expressed concern regarding absentee voters being unduly influenced or intimidated while voting by third parties who went to voters' homes and offered to assist them in voting ballots. Election officials also expressed concerns about the influence of third parties on voters for early voting when voters waiting in line were approached by candidates and poll watchers.

     Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended consequence that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in UOCAVA as amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application can possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said that when uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, ballots might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Election officials in some of these jurisdictions said they were taking steps to help ensure that absentee ballots would be sent to the correct address for the 2006 general election, such as requesting e-mail addresses as a means to obtain information to update mailing addresses or conducting mass mailings to these voters to confirm mailing addresses. However, election officials were concerned that if these efforts are not successful, a number of the ballots mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post Card Application for the November 2006 election would be returned as undeliverable. This was a concern for these election officials because the jurisdictions would have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that would be undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the Federal Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for subsequent general elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, one of the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was that they were undeliverable.⁷

     Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling locations. Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used other types of staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and part-time staff. Depending on the number of early voting locations to be staffed, using experienced staff may not always be feasible, and using other staff may affect the speed with which voters can be processed and may contribute to long lines. As states fully implement their statewide voter registration lists, processing voters at early voting locations may become easier as the voter registration systems evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all types of staff can be more effective in processing voters.

     Conducting Elections

     States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide identification prior to voting; mandated that voting equipment accessible to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required that voter information be posted at polling places on Election Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters.

     Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were not new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 report on the November 2000 general election.⁸ As shown in figure 3,* on the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more large jurisdictions encountered difficulties than medium and small jurisdictions when it came to obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers.

     Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies associated with numerous activities. However, we found in our survey of local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that more large and, to some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because the complexity of administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the number of people and places involved and the scope of activities and processes that must be conducted, such as the need to provide ballots and voter assistance in languages other than English. The results of our local election jurisdiction survey indicate that more large and medium jurisdictions than small jurisdictions took steps--such as through voter education or providing instructions at polling places for poll workers--designed to minimize potential problems. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported encountering on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other third parties that election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations and training.

     Provisional Voting

     Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions regarding the voters' eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal office by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter registration list.⁹ Such states are also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required identification. While HAVA requires that states permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a provisional ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on the methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, election officials receiving provisional voter information are to determine whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state law. If an individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that such individual's provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with state law.

     On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide survey of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, states and local jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they implemented HAVA's provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. For example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the circumstances reported by states and local jurisdictions when a provisional ballot would be offered varied, with some jurisdictions allowing voters claiming they did not receive an absentee ballot to vote provisionally. The results of our survey of state elections officials showed that states also varied as to the location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such ballots to be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4.*

     On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local election procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences among jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, election officials described various factors that affected the counting of provisional ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters to provide missing identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, voters had to provide the required identification before the polls closed for the ballot to be counted, while in other jurisdictions the ballot would be counted if the voter provided the required identification within a specified number of days after Election Day.

     These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 election. These differences and limited data availability make it difficult to determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were cast and counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the data that are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for provisional voting has helped to better facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote.

     Counting the Votes

     Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same across the nation: to accurately process those ballots requiring verification and accurately count every valid ballot. As with the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology.

     In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a local jurisdiction's technology, size, and preferences. The multistep process can involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote count audit to verify the accuracy of the count, certification of the vote count, and recounts of the votes when an election is close.¹⁰ There were some notable developments related to conducting recounts that may be mandatory (because of a close margin of victory) or requested. Some states reported that they added rules for mandatory recounts. Others reported that they changed their guidance for who may request a recount. Regarding vote count audits, while 29 states and the District of Columbia reported they did not require audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5.* Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward doing so since November 2004.

     Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for casting their ballots--early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day voting--enhances eligible voters' opportunity to vote. At the same time, multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the final vote--as little as 2 days in 1 state--provide little time for election officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots. Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types--absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in November 2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic (DRE) machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to help election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they are all accounted for and included in the vote count.

     Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a new state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting--e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment operations and provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at the polls--it magnifies the importance of other aspects of the process, such as accurately matching voter signatures and having clear guidance for determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots.

     The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 votes separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced that margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the first two vote counts. The experiences of election jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts illustrated how small errors in the election administration process can affect the vote count. For example, in at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington state superior court to have been counted without verifying voter signatures or before verification of voter registration status had been completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee ballots were erroneously disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were discovered in the base units of optical scan machines in another county after the election had been certified. Were any state's election processes subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized the recount in Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a consistently error-free count can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the minimum humanly possible.

     Voting Methods and Technologies

     The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6* shows the estimated percentages of all jurisdictions' use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting method most often used for large jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the predominant voting methods most often used remained the same for small and medium jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in response to our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions' choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA requirements--among other factors--are likely influences on the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods.

     HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance components of those standards. According to our local jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance standards for accuracy, reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general election--usually standards selected by their respective states. It is important that system performance be measured during an election, when the system is being used and operated according to defined procedures by voters and election workers, to provide a basis for determining where performance needs, requirements, and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective action can be taken. As was the case for the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected various types of voting system performance measures for the 2004 general election, although some types of measures were collected by fewer jurisdictions than others--in part because they were not well suited to particular voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied with their systems' performance during the 2004 general election, even though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection levels of data on operational voting systems' performance may present a challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system changes and investments.

     Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence in the election process, and according to our local jurisdiction survey estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared responsibility among states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law enforcement officials, and others for most jurisdictions. According to our state survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to jurisdictions, there were differences across states and jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system security standards and reported implementation of system security controls, which was generally consistent with what we reported in our October 2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported in our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply voluntary federal standards to voting systems used for the first time in the November 2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the area of testing, most states reported that they required national or state certification of their voting systems, but the systems covered by those requirements and the criteria used for certification also varied by state and by voting method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) testing continued to be commonly performed by an estimated 92 percent of local jurisdictions that used automated voting systems for the 2004 general election, but the local election officials we talked with described a variety of testing approaches.¹¹ We estimate that two other forms of testing--parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment--were much less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 percent and 43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, respectively.¹²

     Appropriately defined and implemented standards for system functions and testing processes are essential to ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and reliability of voting systems across all phases of the elections process. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and consistently applying appropriate standards and other directives for security management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in their specific election environments.

     The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we examined, such as electronic programming or setup and electronic management. Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and components for the 2006 general election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. Nevertheless, there is real potential for greater integration among voting systems, election systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act on plans to acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more integrated election system environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these interconnected components and systems--some of which remain to be developed--could facilitate the development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies and achieving states' and local jurisdictions' goals for performance and security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are systematically addressed.

Concluding Observations

     The administration of election systems will never be error free or perfect. Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for election officials. Effective management of the election system requires a variety of resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and deployed at regular intervals. These resources include the people who conduct the election and participate in it, the processes that govern what the people do and how the election is conducted, and the technology that facilitates the efforts of the people as they work through the election processes. Although responsibility for election administration falls largely on local governmental units, state and federal governments have a role to play in helping to minimize the types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology evolves and circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might consider what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election processes.

     GAO found that states have made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 2000 general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and new challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes, especially the requirement for statewide voter registration lists for federal elections and new voting systems, both of which are at different stages of implementation across the states.

Notes

     1. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

     2. See appendix I* for a list of GAO reports on elections since 1983.

     3. GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3, (Washington, D.C.: October 2001).

     4. Appendix V* provides more detailed information about our scope and methodology.

     5. GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials, GAO-06-451SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006); and GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions, GAO-06-452SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006).

     6. Our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions was designed to have maximum sampling errors of +/-5 percentage points for the complete sample.

     7. GAO, Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Increased for the 2004 General Election, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-521 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2006).

     8. GAO-02-3.

     9. Six states are exempt from this requirement, in general, either because they permit voter registration on Election Day (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) or because they do not require voter registration (North Dakota).

     10. As used in this report, a vote count audit is an automatic recount, in full or in part, of the vote tabulation, irrespective of the margin of victory, in order to ensure accuracy before certification.

     11. For the questions in our local survey related to types of testing, jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded.

     12. We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel testing to be not applicable.

*Figures and appendixes referred to in this document are not available in this format but can be found in the original publication.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE FULL-TEXT OF A CHAPTER FROM A LARGER PUBLICATION. ALL CHAPTERS FROM THIS PUBLICATION MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE ON SIRS GOVERNMENT REPORTER.

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